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A dynamic environment whose behavior may change over time presents a
challenge that agents located there will have to solve. Changes in an envi-
ronment —e.g. a market— can be quite drastic: from modifying the depen-
dencies of some product to adding new actions to build new products. The
agents working in this environment would have to be ready to embrace this
changes to improve their performance, which otherwise would be diminished.
Also, they should try to cooperate or compete against others, when ap-
propriated, to reach their goals faster than in an individual fashion, showing
an always desirable emergent behavior.
When it is referred to adapting or adaptation, it is in the sense of “changing
towards a better performance”. The evolution of an agent to adapt consists
in two processes: actually try some new behaviors (or part of them); and
adjust these new behaviors aiming for a better performance. When it is
said that the society adapts which is relevant is that the objects which are
adapting are the individuals inside the society. This “bottom–up” approach
of the sense of innovation and adaptation is desirable from the point of view
of multi–agent systems: it is totally decentralized, less prone to malfunctions
when individual fail, and —of course— it models some problems where the
independence of the decision making is crucial.
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The society should try to innovate when there are important changes
which prevent the agents to feel comfortable. In the opposite case, when
agents feel comfortable, the society should try to keep that behavior. Keeping
in mind that there is no real object such as “society” between the agents,
the need of creating one appears. As said before, it is preferable to do it
implicitly; this way the society concept would emerge through the interactions
between the agents.
First we must have a plausible model for an agent. We will base it in the
human psychology, which allows to express its opinion and also to hear the
opinion of other agents which are inside the social network of this agent.
The goal of this model is to allow agents to propagate the sense of comfort
(discomfort) using the opinion, so other agents can feel comfortable (uncom-
fortable) if the majority of their contacts feel this way, despite their own
feelings. Some other emotions will come into play, for example fear, which
in this work will be —later— treated as the uncertainty of the variability of
the outcomes of the agent’s work.
Through this view the global opinion can also be understood as a measure
of the average happiness of the society. This average can be computed also
in smaller communities —these communities can be clusters of agents which
share something, e.g. same goals—, providing information about which com-
munities are more affected by the changes in the behavior.
A different view of the approach is the one that explains it as a mimic of
omnipresence: an agent cannot be in every part of the environment, but it
would be desirable for it to achieve it; that way it would realize when a change
occurs, even though it is not located in the state where the change is visible.
If the agent in question trusts other agents, these agents can communicate
the changes they see to it, achieving omnipresence if there are enough agents
to cover the states of the environment.
The way of communicating this information can be —as in past works—
explicit: there is a communication protocol between the agents, and they use
it to talk between them. Also the trust issues have to be solved taking into
account that not everything an agent says is necessarily true.
Another way to communicate changes is by giving the opinion about how
the agent is dealing with the environment. For a stationary environment this
opinion should —after some time— represent that the agent is comfortable
with the situation, since we expect the agent to adapt easily. After a change,
those agents which were affected by the new conditions may feel uncomfort-
able, and their opinion should reflect just that. The trust issues are still here,
but with some remarks: the opinion of another agent can be trustfully, but
its interests may be not the same ones as this agent’s. Of course, the opposite
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holds also true: the other agent may have the same interests as this agent,
but is trying to deceive through its opinion —so it seems that the agent is not
comfortable when it actually is, and vice versa)—. There is no way, without
at least observing how well the other agent is really doing, to distinguish
between the two cases. There is no need to do so either: the opinion allow
this agent to compute the affinity to that other agent: if they both share a
similar opinion through time, their interests either are the same, or there is
some amount of deception in the opinion sharing. Either way, from the point
of view of this agent, there is no difference: if they both feel uncomfortable,
they should change the way they are doing things. They should keep their
behaviors when they feel comfortable.
In this work a method which guides adaptation through social interaction
is proposed. The proposal aims to show that adaptation is performed without
explicitly reporting by a central authority that changes have occurred. The
proposal shows that the system can adapt without the explicit recognition
of the changes which should trigger an adaptation, which follows the idea
before mentioned: society should change its behavior only when there are
significant changes, and not otherwise.
The proposal is shown with an algorithm based on reinforcement learn-
ing, a well known technique of learning, and through the interactions of the
components of the multi agent system. Much work can be done with the
reported opinion of each agent. The opinion represents the happiness of the
agent. The reported opinion can be deceptive, but as said before, it will
not matter in terms of similarity calculus. Through this opinion clusters of
similar agents can be computed, which would represent different societies.
This project has been developed inside the GTI-IA1 (Group of Technology
in Informatics – Artificial Intelligence) group which belongs to the DSIC
department, Technical University of Valencia.
This work is framed inside a project called OVAMAH (Virtual Adaptive
Organizations: Architectures and Development Methods, TIN2009-13839-
C03-01 ). The ideas supporting the project —and the work done here—
started in two other past projects: THOMAS (Methods, Techniques and
Tools for Open Multi-Agent Systems, TIN2006-14630-C03-01 ) and I2TM
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2.1 Introduction to the Related Work
In this chapter several tools and different information is reviewed for the
sake of completeness. These utilities are the bases on which the main work
is supported.
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6 2.1. Introduction to the Related Work
As mentioned in the introduction, the goal of having an emergent way of
organization is —partially— the aim of this work. The multi–agent system
has to be able to communicate, somehow, the opinion that each individual
agent has. In the case the environment changes, the organization that may
be inside the multi–agent system may decide that there is the need for a
change in the way they were carrying out their tasks.
Through the social information the agents will react to these social changes
and adapt to the new conditions of the environment, provided that the agents
will be able to differentiate friend of foe agents. This information will be use-
ful also to make this differentiation possible.
In section 2.2 a short review of what is a complex adaptive system is
given. It will be shown that every adaptive system can also be seen as a
multi–agent system, capable of learning and adapting.
In section 2.3 a brief introduction to multi–agent systems is given. There
the notion of agent is defined, as well as the ideas that are behind the multi–
agent paradigm. This section is of key importance due to the nature of the
work: the system will allow any kind of agent in the environment, since the
system does not control it, but the system will only work with those agents
which are capable of social communication. Also is to note that every agent
is situated in an environment, which can also be read as “every agent could
have its own environmental representation”, which is of key importance in
other fields as ontology alignment. In this work the representation of the
environment will be treated with more detail in 3.
The differentiation between learning and adapting is explored in section
2.4. When talking about evolutionary systems, for example, two different —
at least two— phases can be identified: the innovation in the system which
has evolved, and the adaptation that the environment will evaluate in an
automated fashion. These details are explored very superficially there.
When talking about innovative behaviors and adaptation, some work
done in psychology is useful. Innovation, adaptation and a measure of them
both are introduced in section 2.5. These ideas are moved to the field of
multi–agent systems further on by defining a model of agent including these
ideas in 4.
Also background of two different —but very closely related— techniques
is provided in sections 2.6 and 2.7. These techniques are in the core of both
the proposed model and the learning algorithm for adaptation.
Lastly some existing in the literature approaches to multi–agent learn-
ing for changing environments, emotional models and social communication
inspired learning algorithms are very briefly reviewed in section 2.8.
2. Related Work 7
2.2 Adaptive Systems
An adaptive system is a set of interacting or interdependent entities, real or
abstract, forming an integrated whole that together are able to respond to
environmental changes or changes in the interacting parts.
Following this definition the entities or agents must form a “whole” which
will respond to environmental changes or changes in the agents themselves.
This whole, which is the system, does not need to be explicitly specified by,
e.g., a set of rules or a topology. When the design of the system is made from
the point of view of the agents located there we can talk about a bottom-up
designed system.
Another definition, very similar in spirit to the former one, is given
to the term complex adaptive systems. According to John Henry Holland
[Waldrop, 1992]:
A Complex Adaptive System (CAS) is a dynamic network
of many agents (which may represent cells, species, individuals,
firms, nations) acting in parallel, constantly acting and reacting
to what the other agents are doing. The control of a CAS tends
to be highly dispersed and decentralized. If there is to be any
coherent behavior in the system, it has to arise from competition
and cooperation among the agents themselves. The overall be-
havior of the system is the result of a huge number of decisions
made every moment by many individual agents
The definition of a complex adaptive system is somewhat more restrictive
than the definition of a classical multi agent system, where the control of the
system or the global behavior does not need to be an emergent effect of the
interactions between the agents. In a multi-agent system the global behavior
can be planned ahead, dividing certain aspects of the system to different
kinds of agents, in a goal directed fashion [Russell and Norvig, 2009]. This
is also the view used in a wide range of fields such as economics, where the
agents’ behavior should be rational in the sense of rational choice theory
[Allingham, 2002], such as they pursue their goals by the means they have
available.
Traditional examples of problems which are appropriate to multi-agent
systems research include online trading, disaster response, and modeling so-
cial structures. Although every CAS can be seen as a multi-agent system,
the traditional examples for complex adaptive systems are focused on the
adaptive part of the system: stock market, ant colonies, ecosystem, immune
system, manufacturing businesses and social systems. As seen in the exam-
ples, the idea of emergence is the key of those systems. For instance, in a
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social system simulation agents are modeled according to certain design cri-
teria. The result of the interaction of the individuals is highly unpredictable
beforehand due to the chaotic nature of the system [Holland, 1999]. Small
variations on the interactions between the individuals or in the initial condi-
tions can develop in a totally different future of the simulated system.
When the adaptive system can self adjust some of its parameters (given
that it has some), the value of the parameters depends only on the history of
the system dynamics. This way the system can implicitly learn which values
for these parameters are better suited to which circumstances. These vague
concepts will be stated more precisely later, when the difference between
learning and adapting is well established.
2.3 Multi-Agent Systems
Quoting from [Ralston et al., 1993]:
Multi-agent systems are computational systems in which several
artificial "agents", which are programs, interact or work together
over a communications network to perform some set of tasks
jointly or to satisfy some set of goals. These systems may con-
sist of homogeneous or heterogeneous agents. Examples of agents
would be ones for detecting and diagnosing network problems oc-
curring on a segment of a local area network; for scheduling the
activities of a group of machines in a workcell on a factory floor; or
for locating agents that are selling a specific product and deciding
on what price to pay. Agents may be characterized by whether
they are benevolent (cooperative) or self-interested. Coopera-
tive agents work toward achieving a set of shared goals, whereas
self-interested agents have distinct goals but may still interact to
further their own goals. For example, in a manufacturing set-
ting, where agents are responsible for scheduling different aspects
of the manufacturing process, agents in the same manufactur-
ing company would behave in a cooperative way, while agents
representing two separate companies, where one company was
outsourcing part of its manufacturing process to the other com-
pany, would behave in a self-interested way. Agents often need
to be semi-autonomous and highly adaptive due to their "open"
operating environments, where the configuration and capabili-
ties of other agents and network resources change dynamically.
Agent autonomy relates to an agent’s ability to make its own
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decisions about what activities to do, when to do them, and to
whom information should be communicated. Scientific research
and practice in this area, which is also called Distributed Artificial
Intelligence (DAI), focuses on the development of computational
principles and models for constructing, describing, and analyzing
the patterns of interaction and coordination in both large and
small agent societies.
A shorter, convenient definition is also given by
[Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008]:
A multiagent system is a system that include multiple autonomous
entities with either diverging information or diverging interests,
or both.
Multiagent Systems (MAS) are a general software paradigm focused on
fundamental questions about autonomy, cooperation, coalition formation,
etc. Currently they are being applied in a wide range of domains, with
significant results. Every MAS can be classified into two different categories:
open MAS and closed ones. The main difference between them lays in the
fact that a closed MAS is created with a fixed structure and goals, where an
open MAS allows agents to freely enter and leave the system dynamically,
and they don’t necessarily share goals, or not the whole of them. This type,
open MAS, is of special interest to this work.
Open MAS exist in dynamic operating environments, where new com-
ponents are aggregated, existing components leave the system, or both of
the former ones. Operating conditions can change also dynamically, in a
unpredictable manner. These open MAS have as their characteristics the
heterogeneity of their participants, the limited trust between them and very
probably a not negligible subset of conflicting goals.
Agent Oriented paradigm, and MAS have become in one of he most im-
portant techniques applied in the resolution of complex problems, belonging
to the artificial intelligence field. This is so, that it is considered as the
next most significant advance in software development [Sargent, 1992] and
the new revolution in software [Ovum, 1994]. Several applications using this
paradigm exist and are being used in a wide variety of areas [Jennings and Wooldridge, 1998],
such as:
• Industrial applications, dealing themselves with:
– Process Control : applied to power transmission (northern Spain),
particle accelerator control, nuclear plant monitoring and diagnos-
ing of failures and also in the steel coiling process.
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– Production: successfully applied in systems dealing with part as-
sembly, painting, product storage, etc. . .
– Air traffic control : applications deployed in airports like Sydney,
Australia, for air traffic management.
• Also being applied in commercial applications to:
– Information Management : such as intelligent email filtering, news
groups or automatic retrieval of information on the web.
– Electronic commerce: for tasks such as automatic product pur-
chase or sale and product search taking into account user prefer-
ences.
• Medical applications :
– Intensive Care Unit patients monitoring : used to control the con-
dition of the patients in the ICU.
– Patient assistance: systems developed to follow the treatment of
patients, taking into account every relevant aspect of their diseases
or conditions.
• Lastly, also used in entertainment, such as:
– Games : the agents technology allows more complex games, with
intelligent features in the characters which can autonomously co-
exist in the virtual environment with their human controlled coun-
terparts.
– Interactive theater : a user can play the role of a character, while
the other characters in the play are virtual, controlled by agents.
2.3.1 Agent Definition
Several proposals to define what an agent can be found in the literature;
none of them is fully accepted by the whole scientific community as being
the definitive definition. One of the simplest ones is the one from Rus-
sel [Russell and Norvig, 1995], which conceives an agent as an entity which
senses the environment and acts on it.
Grounding in this definition, agents can be characterized accordingly to
their attributes [Botti et al., 1999], which will define their behavior to solve
a given problem. Thus we can speak of a social agent, an adaptive agent,
. . . depending on their attributes.
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On the other hand, some other definitions can be found which restrict
the image of the first definition, requiring an agent to fulfill some of those
attributes in their basic definition.
Franklin [Franklin and Graesser, 1996] includes the autonomy attribute
inside the basic definition for an agent. This way the definition formalizes an
agent as a system situated inside and being part of an environment, which
is able to sense and act on this environment through time, pursuing its own
agenda to, this way, act on what it will sense in the future.
Another similar definition is given by Huhns [Huhns and Singh, 1998],
where agents are active and persistent components which are able to sense,
reason, act and communicate.
A definition which tries to reconcile all these differences, based on a set
of attributes is provided by H. Van Parunak [Van Parunak and Odell, 1999].
An agent is defined as an evolution, an increment, of an active object which
may or may not have a set of additional attributes —as many and of the
kind as needed—. This way he compares an agent to a swiss army knife,
where the basic definition is the knife itself, and if it is needed there can be





Figure 2.1: An agent’s accessories (Parunak)
Finally, the most accepted definition nowadays is the one proposed in
[Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995], whereby an agent is a computational sys-
tem capable of autonomous action, flexible, in an environment, categorizing
flexible as:
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• Reactive, which responds to the environment in which the agent is
situated.
• Proactive, capable of pursuing its own plans or goals.
• Social, capable of communicating with other agents, using some kind
of language and communication channel.
Attending to this idea, to name a system “agent” it has to fulfill the former
requirements. Currently only a small percentage of the existing software
accomplishes this definition.
2.3.2 Agent’s Attributes
Some of the properties or attributes which are granted to agents —at different
degrees— to solve particular problems, and which are described by some
works like [Franklin and Graesser, 1996, Nwana, 1996], are:
• Temporal Continuity : an agent is considered as a never ending, contin-
uously executing process, always carrying out its own function.
• Autonomy : according to [Castelfranchi, 1995] an agent is autonomous
if it can operate without direct human intervention, and has some kind
of control over its own actions and internal state.
• Sociability : this characteristic allows an agent to communicate with
other agents, or even with some other entities.
• Rational : the agent is able to reason about the sensed data from the
environment, and compute the optimal outcome. No other outcome
should be better than the one computed by the agent, given the infor-
mation it has —the sensed data—.
• Reactivity : an agent acts because of changes on the environment it
is situated. In this case, the agent senses the environment and the
changes in it conduct the agent’s behavior.
• Proactivity : an agent is proactive when it is able to pursue its goals,
despite the changes that may occur in the environment. This defini-
tion is not in conflict with reactivity. The behavior of the agent is
the result of two different types of behaviors: the receptive behavior
and the discoverer behavior. While following a receptive behavior the
agent is guided by the environment. On the opposite, in a discoverer
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behavior the agent adds up internal processes to obtain its own goals
—or subgoals—. The final behavior of the agent is in between being
totally receptive or being totally discoverer; it has some degree of both
behaviors (more about that on this work, in 2.5 and 4).
• Adaptivity : related to the learning tasks an agent is able to carry out,
and related with the ability of an agent to change its behavior according
to what it has learned.
• Mobility : ability of an agent to relocate itself using a computer network.
• Veracity : assumption in which an agent does not give false information
on purpose, nor tries to deceive another agent or entity.
• Benevolence: assumption in which an agent is willing to help other
agents if the help is not in conflict with its own goals. This attribute
does not prevent the rationality : acting to help other agents can have
zero reward for the agent; if it is benevolent, it will act to help.
Even though there is no consensus about the degree of significance of
each attribute, these properties distinguish an agent from a mere computer
program.
2.4 Learning and Adapting
What is the difference between learning and adapting for an agent?
Learning can be defined as the process of acquiring new knowledge, be-
haviors, values or skills during time. Specifically for a machine, this means
that through certain algorithms the machine is able to generalize key aspects
of the environment where this machine is located, using data gathered along
this time. The machine or agent, ideally, will be able to recognize certain
patterns in the data and generalize from them. When a new time step arrives
the agent will be able to compare the datum obtained from the environment
to the prediction that the algorithm made so far. This process can go (forever
if needed) until the differences between the observed data and the predicted
ones are small enough.
In the former section an adaptive system was defined to be a system
able to respond to changes in the environment or in the system itself. By
able to respond we have to clarify that not every response would be valid.
Intuitively giving a valid response, or being able to respond to changes, is
giving an output which improves the overall outcome of the system compared
14 2.4. Learning and Adapting
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Figure 2.2: Evolution of species is an algorithm which enables adaptation
but requires no learning.
A bit more rigorously: let E be an event that will trigger a change or
adaptation in a system S. Let the adaptation itself be noted simply as
S → S ′. The probability of the system making a change has to be greater
when the event E is given that when that event does not occur, but the
system must converge to a state when all stimuli ceases. So first we can say
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that P (S → S ′|E) > P (S → S ′) to ensure changes when events occur, and
we can later say that lim
t→∞
Pt(S → S ′|E) = Pt(S → S ′) to force convergence
of the system to a stable state (when no other events arrive). This way we
can define when a change is more probable in an adaptive system.
Let the function F : S → R be a measure of the outcome (or fitness)
of a system, the higher the value F has the better. We can write that
given a change in the system (S → S ′) it will be considered a valid change
iff F (S) < F (S ′), that is if the change made the system better suited to the
new conditions.
So from these definitions we do not need to enforce an agent to have the
capability of learning to be able to adapt as part of an adaptive system.
But in an intuitive way, is it necessary for an agent to learn to be able
to adapt? We can find examples in nature, where evolution has brought
different species to different niches very successfully, without the explicit
need for them to learn anything (figure 2.2). Ant colonies behave socially
because evolution determined a greater success ratio for them when they did
compared to when they act on their own. Wolves hunt in packs because they
are more successful as well, not because they learned to do so. When a wolf
is born he automatically has hard wired that when he is mature enough he
will not go hunting alone, if possible, because it is more probable to return
without a prey than when hunting in a pack of wolves. Those are rules which
they follow, rules which were inherited and which were created by evolution
of this species.
The opposite question can also be asked: is learning a form of adaptation?
The definition used for learning does not imply the use of the knowledge that
the agent has gained, only that it improves its knowledge, skills, and so on.
Thus it can be viewed as a good mechanism which would enable an agent
to improve itself, thus, adapt. By conveniently using learning we can have
adaptive agents, which is what intuitively we were expecting.
So between changes (events that trigger adaptation) the system must
converge to a steady state. In this state the fitness function should be as
closest to the optimum one as possible. The question of how many samples
must be seen to ensure appropriate learning was already addressed by E.
M. Gold [Gold et al., 1967] and we know from [Clark, 2001] that under some
light assumptions the learning agent can converge, in the limit, to a sequence
where the difference between the observed data and the predicted data is
negligible, with probability 1.
The possibility of adapting quickly enough to changes before a new set of
changes modifies the environment is of course problem dependent, but since
evolution has created a wide range of systems able to deal with changes quite
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well, it seems plausible to find models —such as the ones found in nature—
to deal with the range of changes that we see in natural systems (which is
astonishing). On the opposite, for a given system or agent, there will always
be an environment receiving changes quickly enough that would not allow
the agent or system to adapt to them. Whether that kind of environments
are interesting or not is out of the scope of the work.
2.5 Psychological Preliminaries
Two different items are borrowed from psychology in this work. The first
one is a measure, called KAI, and the second one is a model for emotions,
called OCC. In this section a brief description of both of them is provided to
understand the benefits that using them could bring back.
Cognitive psychology studies how humans perceive, think, solve and re-
member problems, which explicitly acknowledges the existence of internal
mental states (intentions, desires, beliefs, . . . ). It is closely related to its
neurological approach, cognitive neuroscience. We will be focusing in this
section in problem solving.
In the psychology literature the widely adopted Kirton Adaption-Innovation
Inventory (KAI) [Kirton, 1976] proposes that each individual is located in a
continuum between “doing things better” to “doing things differently”; i.e. be-
ing “adaptive” or “innovative” (figure 2.3). This means that each person has,
in the cognitive level, a degree of susceptibility or inclination to be innovative
in the way they think.
Figure 2.3: KAI index continuum. Any agent’s behavior is located in between
the two extreme values.
Plenty of work has been developed in cognitive psychology using the KAI
theory (e.g. Chamberlain’s theory of strategy [Chamberlain, 2010], Modes
of Leadership towards uncertainty [Wilkinson, 2006]).
Quoting from [Kirton, 1989]:
The Adaption Innovation Theory is founded on the assumption
that all people solve problems and are creative. The theory
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sharply distinguishes between level and style of creativity, prob-
lem solving and decision making and is concerned only with style.
Both potential and evident capacity aside the theory states that
people are different in cognitive style in which they are creative,
solve problems and make decisions. These style differences lie on
a normally distributed continuum, ranging from high adaption
to high innovation. The key to the distinction is that the more
adaptive prefer their problems to be associated with more struc-
ture and more of this structure to be consensually agreed than do
the more innovative. The more innovative are comfortable solv-
ing problems with less structure and are less concerned that the
structure be consensually agreed than are the more adaptive.
Those scoring as more adaptive (the terms adaptive and innova-
tive are relative), as measured by the Kirton Adaption Innovation
Inventory, approach problems within the given terms of reference,
theories, policies, precedents and paradigms and strive to provide
“better” solutions (e.g. continuous process improvement). By
contrast those more innovative tend to detach the problem from
the way it is customarily perceived and, working from there, are
liable to produce less expected solutions that are seen as being
“different” (e.g. re–engineering). Styles of creativity produce dif-
ferent patterns of behavior. All styles are absolutely essential to
deal successfully with the wide range of problems faced by indi-
viduals and groups, over time.
A very adaptive person is one which tries to excel at their job, getting
the best result out of the known situation. On the contrary a very innovative
person would achieve a task by trying different methods, even though some
of them would yield dreadful results. We as persons are located somewhere
in between the two ends of this continuum. In the bakery example given
before, the baker who tries to make bread more efficiently out of the same
flour is closer to the “adaptive” side of the KAI continuum. The baker who
looks for a different way of making bread —or bakes bagels, for example—
is closer to the “innovative” side.
Also extracted from psychology —and independently of the KAI index—
we find a model for emotions, called OCC [Ortony et al., 1988] (the acronym
comes from the names of the authors: A. Ortony, G. L. Clore, and A. Collins).
This model is widely used because it specifies which actions, events or ob-
jects will elicit any of the emotions. It is a cognitive approach to emotions
which embraces twenty two of them, in eleven different dimensions (see figure
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2.4 for a very clarifying diagram). They are eleven dimensions, since all of
the emotions are couples of complementary ones, e.g. hope and fear. The
intensity of the emotions is dependent on four variables:
• proximity
• sense of reality
Figure 2.4: Hiearchy of emotions according to the OCC model.
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• unexpectedness
• arousal
These four variables would modify the weight of the value for each of the 22
emotions.












Some of the enumerated emotions will be of particular importance, such as
<satisfaction,fears–confirmed>, which will give a measure for each individual
agent of how well it is carrying its task.
Psychological models such as the OCC model or the KAI index will be
used to propose an initial approach to the human relationship to the sur-
rounding opinion, and this model will be used latter as the social agent
model. All these in chapter 4.
2.6 Case Based Reasoning
Case-Based Reasoning, or CBR, is basically the process of solving new prob-
lems by analogy to others already solved. By remembering similar situations,
a CBR system is able to find a situation which is very similar to a new one and
apply a solution which is also similar to the solution used in that remembered
situation. The system approaches the idea that human minds work alike:
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when presented with a new problem, a human will try to find another past
situation which is similar to the one presented [Aamodt and Plaza, 1994].
The field of CBR systems extends also to cognitive science through the rela-
tionship with Prototype theory [Lopez De Mantaras et al., 2005].
As an example: lets imagine a person which is confronted with the prob-
lem of solving a blockage in one door. The blockage consists in one medium
size object sitting right in front of the door, preventing the door to be opened.
The person knows that tables can be pushed and move away from their orig-
inal position, but knows nothing about this new object. Nevertheless the
most similar example that is found is the one related to moving tables, so
the person reasons that the solution has to be similar to the one of pushing
away tables.
For a CBR system, a case is an instance of a problem. If the case was al-
ready solved —or learned to solve, or simply seen and marked as unsolvable—
it is usually called a past case, stored case or retained case. Analogously, a
new case is simply a problem which the system is confronted with for the
first time (in the general case).
As mentioned in [Aamodt and Plaza, 1994], the driving force behind case-
based methods has to a large extent come from the machine learning commu-
nity, and case-based reasoning is also regarded a subfield of machine learning.
Learning is important in CBR systems since the idea of analogy learning
arises from the very own description of CBR: once the system has given a
solution for a new case, it is retained both the case and its solution. Cor-
respondingly is done for solutions that were proven to be bad ones. This
information storing process can be seen as learning for those specific stored
cases. If, by chance, the system confronts a new case which is exactly the
same one as a stored case, the system knows that it can use it, because the
system learned that that solution was good for that particular case. The
trick comes when, as in real life happens, the stored cases are similar but not
exact to the new ones. The CBR paradigm addresses this problem.





1Taken from [Aamodt and Plaza, 1994]
2. Related Work 21
Figure 2.5: The CBR Cycle (the 4 REs)
The retrieve phase searches one or more past cases to be used as the
analogy with the new case. This task should also take into account several
subtasks, such as identify the descriptors of the cases, search the database
based on the values for the descriptors, and most important, compute the
similarity from these past cases to the new one. The descriptors can be
obtained via an expert on the domain, or inferred —via statistical methods,
for example—. The similarity measure implies a distance function which can
be given, one more time, by an expert or computed as well —using some
underlying model, for example— [Lopez De Mantaras et al., 2005].
The reuse stage is responsible for transforming the solution stored with
the past case to a useful one for the new case. When the task is similar to
classification, to transformation is needed: the solution is itself the outcome
of the similarity function between the retrieved cases and the new one; the
highest similarity implies belonging to the same class as that stored case.
When the task is of other nature, some adjustments have to be made to
the retrieved solution. Usually, as the similarity decreases, the adjustments
get more intense. The reuse stage should map the retrieved solution —
the solution belonging to the most similar retrieved case— to one inside
the solution space, with the property that the solution proposed by the map
function should be at least as good as the retrieved one. Ideally, the retrieved
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solution would be the optimal one for the new case. In the example relating
the obstacle blocking the door, the solution should be adapted to the new
object: if the variables describing the case of blocking objects include the
mass of the object, and the solution includes the force to apply to that
object, the mapping function in the reuse stage should adapt that force to
the estimated one in the new blocking object.
Revising the proposed solution is when the CBR system has the opportu-
nity to learn new examples. In case the proposed solution wasn’t satisfactory,
a new solution can be provided using domain dependent knowledge. This new
case would include the newly created solution. Learning from the failures is,
for a CBR system, as important as learning from the successes.
The retain stage keeps track of the data that need to be updated in the
case base. The CBR systems must update their case base regardless of the
initial outcome of the proposed solution. The well-behaved solutions must
be kept so future new cases can adapt their solutions using these ones as
basis. The solutions which failed when they were applied must be kept also,
to remind the difference between a success and a failure in the reuse stage:
when mapping a retrieved solution, if it is more similar to a failure than
to a successful solution, the system should prevent, at first stage, giving
that solution as the correct one. Also, the system can always improve the
understanding of the failure when presented another one.
Using again the blocking object example, if we apply the transformed
amount of force (computed at the reuse stage) and observe that the object
moved much further than expected (and assuming that is not desirable), the
revision of the solution and the retain stage should realize that the variable
number of wheels does in fact matter for the computation of the proposal.
The retrieve phase, when entered again once a new case arrives, would em-
phasize the weight of that variable when determining the similarity to other
objects: objects which have three or more wheels and approximately the
same mass are similar to the object mentioned before, more than objects
which do not have wheels but have exactly the same mass. The reuse stage
should, as well, map the solution taking into account the differences between
number of wheels and mass of the new object and the retrieved ones.
2.7 Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement Learning, or RL, is a technique that allows an agent to learn
which chain of actions is best suited for its goals. RL takes into account that
an agent is situated in an environment, thus the actions modify the state of
this environment. The relationship between the environment and the agent
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itself is exploited by this technique.
Every action that the agent performs in the environment may have con-
sequences. These consequences may be observable at the time the action
was executed or may be in the future. The problem the agent is facing is
one of decision making: which chain of actions will allow the agent to reach
its goal? The data of how well an action performed is usually available in
the future, not at the time when the agent has to make the decision. RL
will allow —after a very important learning stage— to decide the best next
action, by only observing the current state of the environment. This is the
learning task.
If we consider to build a robot, which has to carry out some duty, such as
surveillance, we may build this robot with several actions available: to move
forward and backward, to turn, and to stay still. Also, we want the robot
to sense the environment, so we build some sensors in it, such that they can
give the robot’s position, and also a camera to detect objects.
The robot has to patrol some area, but also has to recharge batteries when
the battery level is low. It would be desirable to have this robot learning for
some time how is the environment, so afterwards it could move and recharge.
This way the robot would be scenario agnostic, or independent of the different
environments where we decide to put it in.
Of course the robot is an agent: it fulfills the requirements of being proac-
tive and reactive, being independent and it could communicate with some
other robots if we design it to do so. How can this agent gather the knowl-
edge to reason about which strategy should follow in every case? RL will
address that issue.
Let’s consider the example of the robot: moving forward or backward, as
well as turning or recharging do not always provide a feedback of “how well
the action went”. Nevertheless the aggregation of some actions (called policy)
will provide a positive outcome, or reward, when carried out in certain states
of the environment. If we assume that this positive outcome depends on the
policy, which started in a certain state of the environment, the agent can try
the whole set of policies starting in the whole set of states of the environment.
In the robot example, that could lead to an endless loop of useless chained-
together actions, such as repeatedly moving forward and backward forever.
Instead, if modeling the learning problem as a time dependent, transition
problem, we can figure out that some states are actually reachable by different
means: it is only a matter of time until the agent finds a way to reach certain
states —always assuming that these states are somehow reachable—, and the
agent, through a discoverer behavior, will also find the most satisfying way
to reach these states. Here is where the problem is modeled as a Markov
Decision Process (MDP), as in figure 2.6.
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The MDP is modeled as a 4 tuple (S,A, δ, R), where
• S is the set of states of the environment. It has to be finite.
• A is the —also finite— set of actions.
• δ : S ×A× S → R is the transition function, which gives a probability
such that δ(s, a, s′) is the probability to transit to state s′ being in the
state s and performing action a.
• R : S × A → R is the reward function, which assigns rewards to ac-
tions performed in certain states. R(s, a) is the reward —immediate
reward— obtained by executing the action a in the state s.
In the figure 2.6 the only actions performed are the ai, ai+1, aa+2, from the
states si, si+1, si+2, and the rewards where R(si, ai) = ri, R(si+1, ai+1) = ri+1
and R(si+2, ai+2) = ri+2.
The transitions are deterministic —for now, since there are no other sam-
ples but the one shown in the figure— thus δ(s, a, s′) = 0, ∀s, a, s′, excepting
δ(si, ai, si+1) = 1 and δ(si+1, ai+1, si+2) = 1
In this context the learning task is now more formally defined as to learn
the best policy for the environment (π∗). The policy, π : S → A is sometimes
called response policy, when in the context of game theory. Then the policy
function π will provide the agent with the next action at to execute at time
t while the agent is in the state st. Chaining the functions π and δ the agent
has its behavior defined. Its goals have to be represented through the MDP
model, and the reward function R is critical to define what the agent wants.
The agent must learn the optimal action policy π∗ only through the re-
wards over time. To do so the agent will take into account that the future
rewards are important, so the concept of discounted cumulative reward is
defined:




Figure 2.6: A simple Markov Decision Process
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In equation (2.1) V π is called discounted cumulative reward because: it is
the sum over time of all the rewards that the agent is going to get, and because
every future reward is discounted by a small constant factor γ (0 ≤ γ < 1),
giving more importance to rewards obtained near the present that further
in the future. The closer γ gets to 1, the more importance will get future
rewards.
Now, the agent has simply to find the policy which maximizes V π(st), ∀st
in the environment. This will be the optimal policy (π∗):
π∗ ≡ argmax
a
V π(s), ∀s (2.2)
How to find π∗ is what the RL algorithms deal with. The most famous and
well known is called Q-learning.
Q-learning takes advantage of the Bellman’s equation for optimization: it
breaks the search for the policy maximizing the value of V π into two pieces:
the immediate reward one, and the cumulative part. The algorithm uses a
function called Q : S×A→ R following the spirit of V π. To simplify notation
we can use V ∗ ≡ V π∗ as the discounted cumulative reward for the optimal
policy, and redefine δ as δ(s, a) = argmaxs′ δ(s, a, s′). This way δ is now the
function which returns the most probable state for the transition starting in
s and executing a. The Q function is defined as:
Q(s, a) ≡ R(s, a) + γV ∗(δ(s, a)) (2.3)
The first piece, R(s, a) is obtained instantly. The rest can be computed by
dividing again the value of V ∗ into a definition related with the Q function.
By definition, and using equation (2.3), we know that:
V ∗(s) = max
a
Q(s, a) (2.4)
Then, plugging in the new definition for V ∗ into equation (2.3) the recursive
definition of the Q function is:
Q(s, a) = R(s, a) + γmax
a′
Q(δ(s, a), a′) (2.5)
Now the Q–learning algorithm has to estimate the values of each possible
Q(s, a) for every pair state–action. It can do so by exploring the environment
for an important amount of time. The algorithm can use a tabular represen-
tation for Q and update the value Q(s, a) every time the agent executes a
while in state s. The updating process for Q–learning is defined as:
Q̂(s, a)← R(s, a) + γmax
a′
Q̂(δ(s, a), a′) (2.6)
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The updating process is using the Q̂ values, which are the estimates that
the algorithm keeps for the Q function. With enough iterations —visiting
infinitely often all the state–action pairs— the Q–learning algorithm will
make Q̂ converge to the real Q, if the environment can be modeled as a
deterministic MDP. A very clarifying proof can be found in [Mitchell, 1997],
pp. 378–379.
When the environment is not deterministic the transition function δ —
which we had redefined as δ : S × A → S— and the reward function R :
S × A→ R have an associated probability distribution.
The discounted cumulative reward has to be redefined as the expected
value of the “old” V π:







And the definition of the Q function is the generalization of equation
(2.5):
Q(s, a) = E[r(s, a)] + γ
∑
s′
P (s′|s, a) max
a′
Q(s′, a) (2.8)
The analogous updating process for the nondeterministic case follows the
rule:








The term αn, 0 ≤ αn ≤ 1 is used to update the Q̂ value averaging the old
value and the new one. The term αn can be non–constant, i.e. computed by
a function; this is the case needed to assure that the method will converge,
to have αn increasing as the number of updates increases as well. A proposal
for αn [Mitchell, 1997] is given by:
αn =
1
1 + updatesn(s, a)
(2.10)
The function updatesn(s, a) returns a scalar representing the number of times
that the pair (s, a) has been updated by rule (2.9). This way the values of
Q̂ are updated “less and less” —meaning that the change tends to 0, thus it
is useful for convergence—.
The convergence of the learning process is also guaranteed provided that
the problem can be modeled as a nondeterministic MDP —that is in this
case that the probability distributions depend only on s and a and not, for
example, on previous states or actions— and it is guaranteed that Q̂ = Q
when t→∞. The proof can be found also in [Mitchell, 1997], pp. 382–383.
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The agent must explore the pairs state–action as many times as possible
to find out the Q values. But the agent’s goals probably do not include to
explore the environment, but to carry out some other task. The exploration is
an innovative action needed in order to be able to exploit the environment for
the agent’s profit. The exploration–exploitation dilemma addresses just the
question of how much to explore and when to start exploiting the information
of Q.
Intuitively the probability of choosing an “optimal” —accordingly with
Q— must increase with time, since it is supposed that the information of Q
becomes more accurate with time. In [Mitchell, 1997] one proposal to choose






As the scalar k, k > 0 increases the equation assigns higher probability to
actions exploiting the environment. Of course other functions for k can be
provided (as it is provided in section 5.2).
2.8 Previous Approaches to Adaptive MAS
Different approaches to Multiagent Learning (MAL) are examined here.
Most of the literature surrounding the field of learning in MAS’s is focused
on reinforcement learning, and adaptive MAS are not an exception. Thus it
is interesting to see first a set of some of the algorithms used by the agents
to learn about the rules in the environment.
The fields of Temporal-Difference RL (TD) [Sutton and Barto, 1990] and
Game Theory [Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1967] are usually involved
in these algorithms. From the point of view of TD, the algorithm relies on
dynamic programming to find the best suited policy for the given environ-
ment, following the Bellman’s equation [Bellman, 1957]. No modeling of any
other agent is done. The algorithms usually aim for convergence on their
rewards.
On the other hand, the Game Theory approach focuses on Nash equilibria.
That means that no agent can do better by changing its action unilaterally.
It is called equilibrium because it is supposed that agents will try to do
as best as they can —property which is called rationality—. Since they
cannot do better by changing its behavior, they will not change it. The
problem arising is that for any given environment there may be many Nash
equilibria, thus either all of the agents find themselves in one of those, or
the equilibrium from the point of view of the whole system is not reached.
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Some of these algorithms make use of an explicit coordination mechanism.
To do this, some assume certain behavior of the agents —such as that they
always behave rationally. Of course, every algorithm has its limitations, and
its advantages.
There are some algorithms which through an explicit coordination mech-
anism deal with the problem of MAL. One of them is Q-Learning with SSA
and ABAP [Melo and Ribeiro, ]. The core of the algorithm deals with the
problem of finding the same Nash equilibrium point out of the many possible
equilibria. It assumes the agents will behave rationally to achieve this goal,
but does not need assumptions on the environment.
Some other algorithms based on game theory —just to mention some of
the well-known ones— and Nash equilibria are: Nash-Q [Hu and Wellman, 2003]
—which needs the agents to be rational and has some convergence problems
[Bowling, 2000]—; Nash-DE algorithm [Akchurina, 2009] —which converges
to a stationary Nash equilibrium in the general case, with some assump-
tions, but still needs the player to behave rationally—. There are some other
approximations for the general sum games but they all need the agents to
behave rationally.
On the other side from rational behavior there are some approaches based
in emotion modeling. These modeling can be usually seen in rule-based sys-
tems, expert systems. These have the advantage to behave more human-like
than rational agents —property which is sometimes needed—. Furthermore
emotions can bias an agent decision, thus emotions can be seen as heuristics
as well. The work described in [Steunebrink et al., 2007], based on 2apl, is
very clarifying. Emotions do not provide a mechanism for cooperation, but
it doesn’t prevent it either. The environment is not restricted here, but since
it has a strong basis on psychological models, the agents are supposedly able
to observe other agents actions and emotions, to develop their own.
Also in the reinforcement learning (RL) literature we can find an algo-
rithm which explicitly tackles the problem of exploration - exploitation: how
much to explore and when should the agent use the gathered information.
The algorithmE3 —or extended versionMDP−E3 [Kearns and Koller, 1999]—
does not have strong restrictions on the environment, only that it should be
static. That —and the fact that it does not work with multiple agents—
renders the algorithm unsuitable for MAL and adaptation. Still is a very sig-
nificant approach to the specific treatment of the probability of exploration.
The closest algorithm in spirit to the work presented here is the WoLF al-
gorithm [Bowling and Veloso, 2002a] —there is a revision of the algorithm to
allow high-dimensionality environments [Bowling and Veloso, 2002b]. Both
require the agent to know its payoff matrix, and both allow dynamic envi-
ronments since it learns faster when results are not as expected. There is,
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though, a problem with the convergence of learning: if the agents do not
follow stationary strategies the algorithm will not ensure convergence.
Although there is some literature on Social Reinforcement [Mataric, 1994,
Fabregat et al., 2008], our approach is completely different. The reinforce-
ment will always and only be given by the environment, and the society will
just give its opinion, aiming this opinion towards changing the behavior of
the rest of the agents.
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3.1 Significant Changes and Adaptation
In any open multi-agent system that allows heterogeneous agents, the adapta-
tion of part or of the whole society is a difficult task [Helleboogh et al., 2007].
Innovation should occur when changes that arise are significant enough to
yield losses higher than the cost of the adaptation itself to the new conditions.
Detection of the importance of changes in the environment is not naive, since
the best sequence of actions —best policy— is unknown a priori; we cannot
obtain reference values to compare neither the individual behavior of each
agent nor the one of the whole society.
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For all non-static environments, we can say that there are certain changes
that require innovation from the agents. The changes that could lead to that
innovation on the agents can be divided into the following categorization:
Mechanical Changes these happen in the physical environment, such as
changes in rules or characteristics of the environment where agents are
located.
Social Changes these happen in the organization (in the set of agents).
These changes include, but are not limited to:
• A new social agent appears.
• An existing social agent disappears.
Any agent in the system that is not a social one will represent changes in
the environment, as social agents cannot detect its presence. These non-social
agents will introduce a noise both in the reward and transition functions of
the environment, and since there is no constraint about the observability of
any outcome of the actions of any agent, this change will make deterministic
environments behave like non-deterministic ones —always from the point of
view of the agents situated in this environment. This is essentially the reason
why classic reinforcement learning algorithms —such as Q–learning— cannot
obtain the optimal policy in a MAL.
Despite our efforts to find a suitable representation, changes on how the
environment responds to an agent’s action occur. Some representations will
be more sensible than others to those changes, but for a suitable mapping
function (from the environment to the agent’s representation) there always
be some changes that would alter (and should alter) the agent’s view of
the environment, and its behavior. This is notorious when the environment
changes physically: e.g. a known set of rules of production change in a
supply chain management problem. As an example —in the context of supply
chain management—, in a market there may constantly appear new ways to
build new products, such as by introduction of new objects (functions) which
allow actions unknown until that moment, or by changing prices, timings or
dependencies. All this mechanical changes will have an effect on the system.
Trying to adapt a multi-agent system in a bottom-up way, thus trying to
exhibit emergent behavior through the design of the individuals, has been
always desirable, as long as the the system as a whole gets adapted to the
changes. We have to remind that by adaptation we refer to the opposite of
innovation, according to the KAI index mentioned in section 2.5. To have an
adaptive behavior in the society when a change —a significant change— has
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Figure 3.1: Adaptive robot in the surveillance - recharge task. Two fixed
points are important: the Watch point and the Recharge point (denoted W
and R respectively).
happened, first the society needs some innovation; after exploring the new
opportunities that may have arisen —or realize that former opportunities do
not exist now— the society can exploit this information.
We will address the problem of deciding when to be innovative or adaptive
through the Social Opinion (RΣ and κ functions, to be further explored later
in sections 4.2 and 5.2).
If the agent is doing better each time, or approximately doing as good
as before, the agent should adapt its behavior (according to the KAI index
described before). If, on the contrary, is doing worse than before, the agent
should innovate its behavior. Since doing things better is sensed locally, the
senses of other agents should help to figure out if the society as a whole is
doing better or not. In the section 5.3 a bit more about this advantage of
having agents located in different states in the environment is discussed.
3.2 Innovative and Adaptive Agents in the En-
vironment
The actions available in the environment can affect both the mechanical part
or the social one. In RL the actions are usually seen as mechanical actions:
actions that alter the mechanical state of the environment. But not every
action has to be classified as mechanical actions; there can be some of them
which affect only the social environment. An example is given: let’s have an
environment in which inside a room a robot has to perform some surveillance,
always remaining in a fixed point (like a guard). But as time goes by, the
battery of the robot decreases, so every once in a while the robot must find a
charging point to recharge the battery, and then go back to its watch point.
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Let’s have a robot which is totally adaptive, which knows already where
a charging point and its watch point are, and also knows the path between
its watch point and the changing point (as in figure 3.1). We say this robot
is totally adaptive because it will not try to explore different paths, nor
find different charging points out of the knowledge it has. As long as the
environment stays static from the point of view of the robot, everything will
be performed as before, with no waste of time wandering around the room.
There are some remarks here:
1. What does it mean that the environment stays static?
2. How did that adaptive robot gain the knowledge it has?
To answer the first question we position two different observers: one inside
the environment, immersed in it, and one outside the environment, with
omniscient capabilities (like the “All-Seeing Eye”). To the first observer, a
change happens when the observer notices a different behavior which was not
expecting. That means that the first observer, which can only perceive the
environment from the state it is immersed, will not notice changes which only
affect states the observer will not visit. If the observer visited every one of
the possible states of the environment, all changes would be discovered. The
assumption that the changes remain in the environment until the observer
visits those states has to appear to claim than an immersed observer could
notice the changes. So, for the first observer, the environment remains static
as long as the changes are not visible from the states it visits, or there were
no changes. To the second observer however all changes are visible at any
given moment. This kind of oracle would say that the environment is static
if and only if there were actually no changes.
The answer to the second question is that currently it does not matter, at
least to define static environment or change detection. The robot could have
been programmed with those behaviors a priori, or it could have learned
them. That will not change the fact that the robot will not change its
behavior in a static environment. If the robot learned that behavior it means
that it had to explore the environment to figure out which behavior it should
follow. From this exploration the robot gained the knowledge required for its
task. After that, the robot had to cease its exploration behaviors and only
“focus” on the surveillance-and-recharge task.
In the case we find ourselves with a totally innovative robot, it will wander
around the room without trying to follow any behavior which would accom-
plish its main task, which was to do surveillance and recharge batteries when
needed (figure 3.2). But this robot will be able to detect changes more easily
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Figure 3.2: Innovative robot in the surveillance - recharge task.
than the former, adaptive one, because its goal is not to accomplish its task,
but actually to explore as much as possible the environment.
Now, if a change is introduced, the adaptive robot will not be aware of
it unless the change is actually modifying the path it is following in some
way. An obstacle in the middle of the path would do exactly that. But if the
change is to add a new point of recharge (figure 3.3(a)), maybe nearer the
watch point, the adaptive robot will not notice it.
(a) Only a significant change
is introduced (a new recharge
point).
(b) Two significant changes
are introduced (a blockage in
the path to the other side of
the room and a new recharge
point).
Figure 3.3: Changes are introduced in the surveillance - recharge task.
On the contrary, since the innovative robot does not care much about
its goal —surveillance and recharging—, the changes will be noticed faster
than by its adaptive analogous robot. Not only faster, there will be some
changes that the adaptive version will never see, such as in the figure 3.3(a).
The innovative robot will see this change faster because detecting it depends
only on the probability of the robot to be in a state where the change can
be locally sensed, which —intuitively— will be higher for the one which
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is wandering around and visiting different states than for the robot only
visiting the most rewarding states (the path and the watch and recharge
points). The distribution of probability would affect this assumption, but
since there is no information about where the changes will be produced, we
cannot restrict this distribution to a known one. Given the particular case
when this distribution places changes with higher probability in the “path”
the adaptive robot follows, the innovative one will have less chances of finding
changes. But again, that would require the probability distribution to “know”
about the behavior of the adaptive robot, which is a very unusual case 1.
3.3 Composed Actions
The set of actions available to an agent is dependent of the agent itself and
the state that agent is located in the environment. Some actions are available
only in some states, while others are universally present along the environ-
ment’s states. Usually the actions are seen as functions modifying the state
of the environment. Some outcomes of these actions yield results which are
positive for this agent, while some others may be neutral or counterproduc-
tive. These outcomes will be treated later when discussing the resemblance
to MDP’s.
An action can be seen as a function f : X ×A → X . X is the description
of the environment —the set of variables that through a bijective mapping
function represent the real universe—. The representation of X is also agent-
dependent, but only those which are suitable are considered. From now on,
X will simply denote the union of the representations of the environment
for all the given agents —the complete finite descriptive set of states of the
environment—.
Any action needs a time to be completed; that was not denoted thor-
oughly in the description above. The time needed by a given action f de-
pends on the state of the environment X and the agent performing the action
Ai.
The set of actions can be divided into mechanical actions and social ac-
tions.
Definition 3.3.1. A Mechanical Action is a function fM : X × A → X ,
which require not to communicate with other agents.
Then for the mechanical actions communication is forbidden explicitly.
1In can happen, though, that the changes are introduced by an oracle outside the
environment, which is observing the behavior of a given adaptive robot, e.g. a human
testing the robot itself.
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Definition 3.3.2. A Social Action is a function fS : A × A → X which
require communication between agents.
And for social actions the functions need to explicitly communicate be-
tween agents. This communication may be established by means of mechan-
ical objects in the environment —such as pheromones or even the spoken
natural language between humans which is carried out by physical means—
but in any case both agents need to understand the symbols used in the
communication channel, whichever it would be.
Using the example shown in figure 3.3, lets position two different robots
—agents— in the environment. The mechanical actions would be the ones
mentioned before, such as move in the environment, watch and recharge.
An example set of social actions would be composed by these four actions:
(from the point of view of one of the agents)
• Order an agent to perform action k
• Order an agent to inform about its state inside X
• Inform an agent about my state in X
• Inform an agent about the actions available in my state ∈ X
These social actions change the internal beliefs of an agent. Of course the
beliefs of an agent are represented, as said before, in a suitable way, inside
X .
For the example given before a curiosity shows up: composing social
actions is possible very easily: lets add a new agent and name the three
of them as A1, A2, A3. If A1 issues the action of requesting A2 to perform
watch, A2 can easily refer this “order” to other agent, say A3. The outcome
of this action will not be the same of the original one, since A2 and A3 are
not in the same state in the environment, but nevertheless the decision of
performing the action by the agent itself or referring the action to other agent
can be taken. A clearer example of function composition can be given in the
example: lets have A1 issue an action to A2 which reads: “order agent A3 to
order me to inform A3 of my state in X ”. The composition is actually seen
as: order(A1, A2, order(A2, A3, order(A3, A1, inform))).
The composition of actions is not actually anything new: the mechanical
actions are composed every time. E.g. when performing watch it is done on
the environment modified by the actions taken before:
watch(move(move(. . . , A1), A1), A1)
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Of course there is more than one agent in the environment, so the actions
taken by the rest of the agents would modify as well the state of the environ-
ment, which is needed as the argument to the next action to be taken by the
agent A1. As said before, it is this fact the one that does not allow classic
single agent RL algorithms to operate perfectly in a MAS: the composition of
the actions are not only chained by our own actions, but also by the actions
of other agents.
3.4 Composed Environment
Having two different types of actions defined, the environment can also be di-
vided into two different not mutually exclusive environments: the mechanical
and the social one.
The mechanical environment is defined as the set grouping together all
the objects —variables— that the mechanical actions can modify. That is,
the set of variables that may change once a mechanical action is performed.
For a given mechanical action only part of the set of agents will notice a
change in the mechanical environment. This set is a subset of the agents
situated in the environment which are capable of observing the state of the
nearby environment.
The social environment, analogously, is the set of variables that can be
modified through the set of social actions. In this case, the variables may
be only observable by the agent initiating the action or the one which is
carrying it (or both). No other agent will be able to observe any change in
these variables —which conform the social environment— after carrying out
the social action.
Definition 3.4.1. The mechanical environment is defined as the set contain-
ing the variables which are the union of the images of the mechanical actions:
XM ⊆ X .
Definition 3.4.2. The social environment is defined as the union of the
images of every possible social action f that can be ever executed (F ): XS =
∀a, a′ ∈ A
⋃
f∈F f(a, a
′), XS ⊆ X
Furthermore, the environment can only be built by the aggregation of the
two sets described above.
Definition 3.4.3. The environment is built from the union of the mechanical
and social environment sets: X = XM ∪ XS
3. Composed Environment 39
Through these definitions the differentiation between social and mechan-
ical environments can be established. It is out of the scope of this work, but
worth to mention it, that in the social environment some objects can emerge.
Concepts such as organizations, roles and norms can emerge through the use
of social actions. These objects do not exist in the mechanical environment,
nor have an analogous representation there.
For example, through communication agents can establish a hierarchy or
orders: agent A1 orders agents A2 and A3 to perform some actions. Agent A2
usually delegates and orders other agents to perform these actions. Agent A2
just orchestrates the results. Here, the concept of role has emerged through
the repeated use of social actions. In a similar way the concepts of society
and norm arise as well.
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4.1 Psychological model
The psychological model is based in the OCC [Ortony et al., 1988] emotional
model. In human emotional modeling we use emotions —plus some other
factors— as the inputs which govern the opinion the individual will give to
the society. The opinions of the people —which are in this individual’s so-
cial network— will influence his KAI index. The KAI index will determine
whether to behave innovatively or adaptively. The outcomes of the actions of
the individual, again, will be evaluated through his emotional system to pro-
duce an emotional response, which is a set of emotions and their intensities.
Figure 4.1 summarizes the relationships.
There are some remarks which are particularly interesting. The individual
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Figure 4.1: Human model based on the OCC emotional model transforma-
tion.
will take into account all the opinions of his social surrounding, or social
network, but not every opinion has the same importance. People which are
trusted by the individual (e.g. his family) will be more trustworthy than
others (e.g. people that he encounters on the subway). The same principle
applies to the reputation, i.e. people known to be experts in the surrounding
environment will be taken into more consideration than those known to be
novice (e.g. elder family may have a stronger impact than some other family
members which are younger than himself).
Another important step is the way each individual interprets the outcomes
of their actions. In Figure 4.2 a set of 11 functions are shown which transform
the emotional stimuli to a set of 11 emotions with intensities, which just is
the emotional response. This set of functions is peculiar for each person,
so it is part of their personality —which is invariant. The functions which
Figure 4.2: Emotional response computed for an individual. Each of the 11
emotions are computed by a different function.
conform the emotional response can take any number of observable events
or objects in the environment, as well as the observable inner state of the
individual, in a cognitive fashion. The functions cannot take any parameter
which is not observable by the individual, e.g. the happiness of somebody
else; just the expression of happiness could be a parameter. The functions
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must follow the guidelines described by the OCC model, such as some events
should influence some emotions and not others [Ortony et al., 1988].
4.2 A KAI based emotional social agent model
One of the aims of this work was to propose a plausible model close to a
human psychological model for a social agent that is an agent which is able
to express its opinion and to hear the opinions of the agents in its social
network. We will use the psychological model proposed in the former section
to postulate a new social agent model that we called “KAI based emotional
social agent model”.
An agent is situated in an environment, but this environment is not only
the physical world ruled by mechanical changes; it also comprehends the
social world. The environment E is modeled as < S,A, δ, r >, being S the set
of states the environment has; A the analogous set of actions; δ : S×A→ S
the transition function, which changes the environment state to another when
an action is performed; and R : S × A→ R the observable reward function,
that yields a reward when an action is performed in a state.
The theoretical interest of having emotions is double: On the first hand
agents that are modeled with emotions resemble better human behavior —by
not showing a pure rational behavior—, thus the model can be more accu-
rate when simulating humans. On the second hand, there is psychological and
neurological evidence [Martinez-Miranda and Aldea, 2005, Oatley et al., 2006,
Damasio and Sutherland, 1995] that emotions may be necessary for a person
to behave intelligently, which arises questions about their necessity in agents.
The transformation between emotional stimuli and emotional responses
will be carried out by a set of 11 functions which output the intensity for
each one of the 11 dimensions. Again, the functions’ domains can be com-
posed only by the set of observable and measurable objects and events of the
environment and some actions of the agents located there. The emotional
response is very important when emitting each agent’s opinion. The Social
Opinion will be the aggregation of every agent’s opinion taking into account
the trust for each of them, and the reputation which each agent has in this
society.
An agent is modeled as < P ,S, RΣ, κ >. P is the set of 11 functions
Pi : Rn → R, which map the emotional stimuli to the emotional response, and
should —just as a reminder— follow the OCC model of emotions; S ∈ Rn,
is the set of emotional stimuli, which can be any observable data in the
environment and in the agent itself, suitable to be an input of some of the
P functions; RΣ : R11 → R is the social opinion function, used to expose
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a public, observable opinion about the agent’s emotions; and κ : RΣn → R
is the KAI index function calculator, which computes how innovative this
agent is being given the emotional response.
The κ function is closely related to the KAI index: the KAI index mea-
sures how an individual is in between the two values of being innovative or
adaptive, which can be reinterpreted as being exploratory or trying to exploit
the information gathered. Or course the values will not correspond one to
one between the two concepts, but the similarity of the concepts is there. A
suitable transformation to compute κ is given in section 5.2.
Will the emotional response functions Pi be linear, they can be repre-
sented by a 11×n matrix P : all the intensities for the emotions of the OCC
model are computed as R = P · S, where R is the 11× 1 vector containing
the emotional response intensities and S is the n×1 vector for the emotional
stimuli data.
In section 5.1 we give explicit functions for P , RΣ and κ. All the functions
presented in P and the function RΣ are linear (not the κ function). There
exist other definitions for these functions which work well —or better— un-
der this model; we do not claim that they are optimal in any sense, only
convenient.
4.3 Differences between Innovative and Adap-
tive Agents
Even when an important change is made, if the agents in the system are
behaving in an adaptive way, it could happen that they never realize there
was a better solution available after the change: they are not innovating to
explore some other possibilities. This problem is hard to solve because two
different problems come together:
• Agents do not know when a change will happen.
• If there is a change, the agents will have to search for differences in the
environment behavior.
As seen in the relationship between agents and environment in section
3.2, adaptive agents are prone to miss changes. Their behavior is almost
“hard coded” once they discoverer a way to achieve their goals. Innovative
agents, intuitively, will find these changes faster.
Lets start by defining the changes in strategies for both types of agents:
4. Agent Modeling 45
Definition 4.3.1. An adaptive agent is one which tries to improve its per-
formance by improving individually each action. It implies that the strategy
the agent follows does not change once the agent has found one that works.
Definition 4.3.2. An innovative agent is one which tries to explore different
strategies, thus usually discovering many ways to achieve a goal, but not
intensively exploiting any of them.
Then according to the definitions, an adaptive agent does not need to
look for a different policy —once it has one that works— since it can reach
its goals. But an innovative agent will not use the information it gained
about the best policies to exploiting the environment and yield good results.
An equilibrium between them is always desirable.
Lemma 1. For an adaptive agent, any change in the policy will yield worse
performance than no change at all.
Proof. An adaptive agent Ai is adaptive because the sequence of actions is
optimal. The proof is naive: for the given agent Ai it holds that r(s0, a0) +
. . .+r(sk, ak)+. . .+r(st, at) > r(s0, a0)+. . .+r(sk, a
′
k)+. . .+r(st, at), ∀a′k 6=
ak, k ∈ [0, t], otherwise Ai would not have an optimal sequence of actions,
thus would not satisfy the definition for an adaptive agent.
Lemma 2. Adaptive agents tend with probability → 0 to explore as time→
∞
Proof. Since adaptive agents are the ones with the lowest KAI index, their
behavior is to stay in the policy they are following. They will not change
policies (from Lemma 1).
Theorem 1. Innovative agents detect changes more probably than adaptive
ones.
Proof. A short intuitive proof by contradiction: if an agent is able, always,
to detect new actions available it means the agent is always trying to move
to different states in the environment; otherwise the agent would not see
those actions. For an agent to move to all possible states in the environment
it is needed a high innovative behavior, regardless of the performance of its
actions. Thus they could never behave adaptively, not even for a short period
of time, since in this short period of time some new actions could appear and
disappear in some states of the environment.
More formally: a change —visible in a state s— can occur with a prob-
ability p(s|C,E) given the a priori probability of a change C and the en-
vironment E. For an innovative agent the probability of visiting a state
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s′ is p(s′|E), depending on the topology of the environment. For an adap-
tive agent the probability of visiting a state s′′ is p(s′′|E) = 1, ∀s′′ ∈ π, 0
otherwise, according to the definition for an adaptive agent. Thus, unless
p(s|C,E) << p(s′′|C,E), s /∈ π, s′′ ∈ π —which would mean that changes
occur, somehow, more probably in the states that belong to the policy π—
the net result is that p(s = s′|E,C) > p(s = s′′|E,C),∀s, s′, s′′ ∈ X, being
X the whole set of states.
Of course, if the set of states X contain only states which are part of the
policy of the adaptive agent, the adaptive agent has the same probability
than the innovative agent.
And if the changes are distributed more probably in the states which the
adaptive agent visits than in the other ones, and the probability of random
visiting them is the same, the adaptive agent will have more chances to find
a change than the innovative one. But again, that would mean that the
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5.1 Relationship with MDP’s
The Social Welfare Reinforcement Learning (SoWelL) algorithm proposed
here allows an agent to learn an optimal policy in a MAS, as long as the
environment stays stationary; but also allows agents to innovate their policies
when there is a significant change. The algorithm changes the learning ratio
accordingly to the agent model specified in section 4.2. In spirit it is similar
to WoLF [Bowling and Veloso, 2002a], but instead of computing the average
policy π̄ to figure out if the agent must learn further, SoWelL bases the
probability of exploration calculus —as described before— on the agent’s
emotional response and the social opinion. As a byproduct, that will allow
computation of trust and reputation, since the agents know who gave an
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opinion different to their own, and at which grade that was.
The goal of the algorithm is keeping the agent adaptive while the en-
vironment stays static (with no significant changes) but innovative when a
significant change happens, until the society reaches a (local) maximum.
Since the problem can be modeled as a MDP, it seems appropriate to use
an algorithm rooted in the RL principles, such as Q–learning or a variant of
it. A review of Q–learning was shown in section 2.7, but as a remainder of the
challenges pending while using Q–learning it is to remember that algorithms
in this family are guarantied to converge to the optimal policy when the
agent has explored the environment enough.
By exploring enough it is intended to say to visit every pair <state,action>
infinitely often. In practical approaches the latter is sometimes impossible to
accomplish, since some states are very hard to reach, or even undesirable by
any means (e.g. detection of failure of every actuator in a robot). The prob-
lem called exploration-exploitation dilemma —which has been addressed be-
fore ([Kearns and Singh, 2002, Bowling and Veloso, 2002a])— tries to solve
when an agent should explore the environment, or exploit the actions it knows
already that will yield the best cumulative reward. The algorithm proposed
next does, in some manner, bypass the problem by using a function which is
decreasing in time if the environment behaves statically, which, at the end,
it is what was intended.
Some algorithms in the RL family allow finite representations of infi-
nite state environments, by means of using the core ideas of a traditional
method (e.g. Q–learning) with techniques such as Soft State Aggregation
(SSA [Singh et al., 1995]), Case Based Reasoning (CBR) and so on. So
from this perspective there would be no problem other than the actual
(usually negligible) error induced by these mappings between Rd and X ,
d ∈ N, card(X ) <∞. For CBR’s retrieval stage the same techniques can be
applied, providing a more powerful solution if the reuse stage is implemented
conveniently.
5.2 Mechanism for adaptability
Recalling what was said before, the agent is learning the functions which
govern the behavior of the environment; it cannot distinguish between what
it hasn’t learned yet and what has changed. But what the agent can do is
to compute a difference between the expected value for its action and the
observed one. It will not help to detect a change in a true or false manner,
but will give a degree of adaptiveness of the agent to the environment.
On the other hand, the KAI index (which is the probability of exploration
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k1) has to be computed from the emotion response of each agent. Thus,
since every agent has its own different personality, there will be a bias in the
outcome of both the emotion response and, consequently, in the exploration
probability. This is a convenient fact that will allow the MAS to niche their
agents in a faster way than without the emotions in the agents.
Two of the emotions will be directly linked to the computation of the KAI
index k: the joy/distress of the agent, noted by J , and the hope/fear, noted
by H. The functions which compute both of them are shown below:
J = Qt+1 −Qt
|max(Qt+1, Qt)|
(5.1)
Notation: Qt means the discounted reward the agent has learned so far at
time–step t for the given state and the taken action, such as Qt ≡ Qt(st, at).
The normalization is done by the maximum in the pair Qt+1, Qt; then J ∈
[−1,+1].
H = − Qt+1 −Qt−1
2 max(|Qt+1|, |Qt−1|)
(5.2)
The hope/fear emotion is computed as the uncertainty of the variability of
the Q-values, based on the first discrete derivative of the Q-function.





This definition of RΣ (figure 5.1) allow an agent to give a positive opinion
when it feels joy (J → 1) and feels no fear (H → 1). The agent will give
a negative opinion when it feels distress and has fear. The values of RΣ are






Table 5.1: Results of computation of RΣ in the limit cases {+1,−1} for J
and H
1Every parameter belongs only to one agent. Subscripts have been omitted for the sake
of clarity; e.g. when it is said k it really means kAi , for the agent Ai. That holds for every
parameter in the section.
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Recalling equation (5.3) and table 5.1 it is observable that this agent is
somewhat pessimistic. It will only give positive feedback when it feels joy
and hope. As the joy tends to distress, it will start giving negative feedback,
accordingly to the hope —or certainty— that it has about the future. It is
to notice that RΣ resembles one of the emotional pairs described in the OCC
model: the satisfaction/fears-confirmed pair. The resemblance goes into the
semantic level —how satisfied is this agent with the current actions in the
current environment— as well as into the variables needed to the emotional
response —the events and objects needed to compute them are the same—.
This resemblance may induce a change in a future model to re-write RΣ as
one of the P functions: the one that computes satisfaction/fears-confirmed.
This way the personality, which is invariant to an agent, will include how the
agent treats its emotional stimuli to expose an opinion, without the need of
a different function, which is more intuitive: we usually say —for a person—
“she is optimistic. That goes with her personality”, hence the cause resides
in the personality.
The social opinion, weighted by the reputation and trust of each of the
agents, will be used by κ function to compute the KAI index. The total





for every agent Ai, including itself. Of course different agents will have
Figure 5.1: Function RΣ plotted. Its behavior in the limits is more clearly
shown in table 5.1
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Figure 5.2: Function κ as a time series kn. X-axis: n; Y-axis: σ; Z-axis: kn
different values for ρ (reputation) and τ (trust). It must hold that 0 ≤ ρ, τ ≤
1, ∀Ai.
For the KAI index calculation —which we can see as the exploration
probability—, carried out by the κ function, we propose a time series in
which both the last value of κ and the total social welfare σ from equation
(5.4) are used:




The series is similar to a sigmoid when centered around σ = 0 (see figure
5.2), but converges differently. The κ series is not very sensible to the initial
value k0, as long as k0 ∈]0, 1] (with k0 = 0 it holds that ki = 0, ∀i, regardless
of the values of σ).
5.3 Convergence of Learning
Convergence of the learning process is proven under some assumptions:
• The agent can represent the universe without taking into account other
agents. Al least the agent has function of representation which can rep-
resent the universe with no ambiguity with a high probability, proba-
bility that increases with time.
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• The agent knows the set of actions that are available at any time.
• The agent can observe the response of the system to its actions.
Figure 5.3: Function κ. X-axis: n; Y-axis: σ; Z-axis: κ. The iterations are
now 1000, and it starts to take the shape of the function it converges to.
To prove that the algorithm converges, the kt series has to converge as well
—necessary condition—. In figure 5.3 κ is depicted using a bigger number
of iterations (1000), which indicates the possibility of the series to converge
to a function. Being the kt series convergent, the Q-learning algorithm will
behave as usual, thus converging to the optimal policies (under the former





Lemma 3. kt+1 converges for t→∞
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1 = kt + 2
kt(σ−2)
1− kt = 2kt(σ−2)
1 = (1− kt)2−kt(σ−2)
2σ−2(σ − 2) = 2σ−2(σ − 2)2−kt(σ−2)(1− kt)
2σ−2(σ − 2) = 2σ−2−ktσ+2kt(1− kt)(σ − 2)
2σ−2(σ − 2) = 2(1−kt)(σ−2)(1− kt)(σ − 2)
ln(2)2σ−2(σ − 2) = e(1−kt)(σ−2)ln(2)(1− kt)(σ − 2)ln(2)
(1− kt)(σ − 2)ln(2) = W (ln(2)2σ−2(σ − 2))
1− kt =
W (ln(2)2σ−2(σ − 2))
(σ − 2)ln(2)
kt = 1−
W (ln(2)2σ−2(σ − 2))
(σ − 2)ln(2)
(5.7)
In equation (5.7) the W (x) stands for the Lambert-W function such that
for every number x ∈ R, x = W (x)eW (x). Equation (5.7) shows that the
proposed κ as a time series converges to the function depicted in figure 5.4.







Figure 5.4: κ converges to this function. In the X-axis the social opinion σ
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This function is not symmetric with respect to the X–axis. The behavior
of the convergence function is desirable from the psychological point of view:
it is easier for the agent to adapt than to innovate. The first derivative of
that function would show that it is steeper when σ > 0 (σ is in the X–axis)
than in the case of σ < 0. That means that the agent tends to adapt more
easily than innovate. Of course, the main principle that started the design of
the κ function is still preserved: negative values will move the agent towards
the innovative side, and positive ones towards the adaptive side.
Theorem 2. The SoWelL algorithm proposed converges when t→∞
Proof. The proof of the convergence of the learning algorithm follows intu-
itively from the proof of Q-learning convergence [Watkins and Dayan, 1992]:
The agents will learn a policy converging to Q∗ while exploring. With enough
time, the Q values will converge; thus their opinion will be positive, making
them explore less and less. It is possible, though, that the values obtained are
optimal only locally, when the exploration time wasn’t enough to make them
visit other states very often. In short, given that the Q–values converge, and
the κ function, which is the exploration probability, converges as well when
the Q–values do, the whole algorithm does.
The personality P —or transformation of the observable— and the KAI
calculus function κ can make the algorithm non-convergent. I.e. if an agent
has a transformation which result is to expose an opinion that is not related to
the Q values, convergence is not probable. These two functions —particularly
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6.1 Study Case
To study the effects of social learning on a practical level we have proposed
a simple collaborative game: a market economy in which the production line
has different types of units, and the agents should build some or consume
certain products for their survival. The agent enters the system with certain
amount of money and life points; these values hold for every agent entering
the system. In this scenario the agent competes with other for survival, or by
obtaining as many points as possible. But it can collaborate to build some of
the intermediate products, and earn money to use it later. Agents with life
below 0 disappear: it is considered by the system that the agent is unable
to produce more than what it consumes. This is called a failure of an agent
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—it failed to be productive—. In the event of a player disappearance, the
market automatically removes all products which were unsold and belong
to that player. If the agent reenters the market, it spawns with the initial
values of life and money. The market hosts the products that the agents
build. Any product may have n dependencies of ni, i ∈ [0, p] units of m
different products, and need some specific time to be built.
Finally, the price of the products is fixed by each one of the agents.
To get a product from the market the player must pay in advance. Nega-
tive balances are not allowed, but agents are able to modify the price of the
products they built even when they are already on the market.
In this environment the actions of other players are not observable, but
its results may be: they cannot tell if an agent is making a product, but they
notice —if they are willing to— that the agent built something when it puts
the product on sale on the market.
The system —the market— may change the production rules of the sys-
tem at any time. The variations allowed are the creation and deletion of
product types, changes on the dependencies —both the amount and the
type— and the modification of the base time needed for production. Those






Figure 6.1: Overview of the Economic Market Simulator mini–Framework
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The social changes encloses the possibility of agents entering and leaving
the market at any time.
This framework is illustrated in figure 6.1. The environment can simulate
supply chain processes, where demand can vary and rules can be altered. This
way, a good agent would innovate and adapt to the variations automatically,
and —with some time— come back with a good behavior competing and
collaborating with other agents inside the environment.
6.2 Simulation
Reinforcement learning in a continuous domain environment cannot be ap-
plied unless some conditions are given. For the simulation the agents use a
well-known technique for grouping states (Soft State Aggregation, or SSA)
which allow them to represent an infinite space of continuous values, with
D dimensions, in a D-dimensional finite space (clusters) [Singh et al., 1995].
For the study case the environment state space is seen as a D-dimensional
matrix, grouping the states (∈ RD) in an exponential way. The discrete po-
sition (or index of the cluster) i for the continuous variable x is computed
as:
i = min(blog2(x+ 1)c, ω) (6.1)
Bounding i on some number (ω) which is to be considered near to the max-
imum that is to be seen for that variable, for D dimensions that are taken
into account for the environment representation. Therefore the total set of
states which every agent must represent is ωD × |A|. The number of actions
|A| is known by every agent (although it may change with time).
Using SSA the retrieval phase of the CBR system allows to choose cases
“similar” because they share a small distance between them in terms of the
grouping defined by the clustering function (6.1). This function is convenient
for its simplicity, although much better representation could be achieved by
using some other metric which would allow a probabilistic outcome —the
way usually SSA is defined is by this kind of metrics—.
The reuse and revise stages are carried out by using the algorithm shown
in section 5.2. The algorithm, grounding in Q–learning, is always retaining
the outcome of the solution, so the solution applied to the situation that
the agent is facing is always recorded —implicitly— as well as its outcome
—explicitly by recording it to estimate the Q–function—.
Two different types of agents will be differentiated; those who can receive
and understand social opinions —executing Social-Welfare RL— and those
which not —using standard Q–learning—. The social network between the
social agents is established as a fully connected graph. Scalability may not be
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a problem, since there are many different ways to communicate in this fully
connected graph by using communication artifacts: similarly as the jabber
protocol can do, the communication can be done by using an amount of
messages in the order of O(n) messages, being n the number of participants.
Issues of how convenient is to have messaging services such as the latter
proposed are beyond the scope of this work —trust issues, delays and so
on—.
Learning of the Q-table was done individually for both the social-aware
agents and the non-social. Parameter ω was fixed at 5, which means that
the last state for each dimension will represent values of x ∈ [15,+∞]. The
dimensions (or variables) taken into account to represent the environment
are the number of products of each kind in the market plus agent’s life and
balance.
Three types of products where loaded: Wheat, with no dependencies and
needing 1 cycle. Flour, requiring 2 units of flour and 2 cycles. And Bread,
eatable, providing 10 units of life, requiring 2 units of flour and 2 cycles.
The actions available to the agents are the creation of any kind of the
products, plus another one called eating. The total space of representation
needed by each agent is only of (5)(3+2) × 4 = 12500 states. Learning stage
has taken 1, 000, 000 cycles, with a probability of exploration k = 1, hop-
ping to explore as many states as possible, as many times they could. Every
agent starts with exactly the same Q-matrix at the beginning of the simu-
lation. The experiment includes three different scenarios, thus there are two
significant changes. The scenarios are:
1. No changes in the environment.
2. Relaxing the production rules: Flour needs 1 unit of time and 1 unit
of Wheat ; Bread needs 1 unit of time and 1 unit of Flour.
3. Hardening the production rules: Wheat needs 2 units of time; Flour
needs 2 units of time and 3 units of Wheat ; Bread stays as originally,
needing 2 units of time and 2 units of Flour.
The scenarios data is summarized in table 6.1. The column “Total Time”
refers to the needed time to manufacture that product; e.g. in scenario 1,
for the product Flour, it is needed 4 units of time because the dependencies
demand 2 units of wheat —2 units of time for making that wheat— plus the
required time to assemble the flour: in total 4 units of time.
As a remark, it is important to control the value of κ —to avoid ma-
chine precision problems— such that never reaches 0. For that matter, the
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Case Product Time Dependencies Total Time
Scenario 1
Wheat 1 0 1
Flour 2 2–Wheat 4
Bread 2 2–Flour 10
Scenario 2
Wheat 1 0 1
Flour 1 1–Wheat 2
Bread 1 1–Flour 3
Scenario 3
Wheat 2 0 2
Flour 2 3–Wheat 8
Bread 2 2–Flour 18
Table 6.1: Overview of the three scenarios
computation is modified as:
κ =

ε if κ < ε
1− ε if κ > (1− ε)
κ otherwise
for a given ε→ 0 which is representable by a machine.
It is expected to observe a better adaptation of the social-aware agents
compared to the non-social ones, which use traditional reinforcement learning
(SSA Q-learning).
6.3 Results
Two different experiments were carried out: the first one with 4 agents in the
system, and the second one with 32. Two rounds per experiment were done:
one with classic Q-learning agents (using SSA to represent the environment),
and another round with social aware RL agents (also using SSA). In both
experiments we measured the number of failures and the welfare of the so-
ciety, for the two types of agents. Both values are normalized per number
of agents. In each figure the two vertical lines represent the moment in time
when a change in the environment was made.
The failures represent agents which were in the system for a time yielding
loses instead of producing welfare. It is the equivalent of business having
loses in the economy: they start with an initial amount of resources but they
have a limited time until they start yielding benefits. Otherwise they would
confront bankruptcy. Notice that the lower the number of failures, the better
the system as a whole —it means the system has coped with many different
agents and few of them had problems with their policies—.
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The welfare represent the wealth of the society. The higher, the better.
The final aim of the system is, actually, to produce as much wealth as pos-
sible. The agents, which do not cooperate explicitly, face the problem of
concurrency in the environment, hence the fact that the double the number
of agents does not mean the double of wealth.
From the data in figure 6.2 we see that social aware agents are able to
cope with the changes better than the others. The algorithm keeps agents
innovative until they reach a (local) maximum; after this, the agents start
adapting their behavior to the new conditions. Nevertheless, we see in figure
6.3 that the welfare per agent in the social-welfare society is not much higher
than the one in the non-social. The agents have not find a good policy.
Despite the fact that the number of failures is low, their achievements are



























Figure 6.2: System with two significant changes, failures per agent compari-
son. 4 agents in the system.
In figure 6.41 it is shown that social agents have fewer failures than non-
social ones. As expected in the theory, the more agents the system has, the
1The Y-axis is in logarithmic scale

























Figure 6.3: System with two significant changes, welfare per agent compari-
son. 4 agents in the system.
easier is to notice changes; but also when there are many agents, it is more
probable that they interfere with each other, which would make harder to
find a policy in a short period of time —policies get more complicated as
agents are added in the society—. That explains also the data shown in
figure 6.5, where a big difference between the two types of agents appear.
When having more agents in the system it is easier to have them spread out
of the different states, so when the majority agree that they should behave


























Figure 6.4: System with two significant changes, failures per agent compari-
son. 32 agents in the system.























Figure 6.5: System with two significant changes, welfare per agent compari-
son. 32 agents in the system.
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7.1 Conclusions
This work has presented a new agent model based on three main topics: the
KAI index, emotions and the opinion of the society in which it is immersed.
The communication of the opinion inside the society is a good mechanism to
trigger innovation when a change requires it. The mechanism works better
when the number of agents increases, which is very promising in terms of
scalability when the MAS is using SoWelL as the learning algorithm.
The convergence of SoWelL has been proven, but the agents can con-
verge towards a non-global optimum. Where this may be a problem for
some environments, it can be alleviated with agents which are even more
pessimistic than the one showed in this work —being more pessimistic would
move the KAI index towards innovation faster, thus exploring the environ-
ment longer—.
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The decision of whether the society should innovate or adapt is carried
out by the Social Opinion. The agents cope with the problem by locally
sensing the opinion of their social network and making a local decision. The
aggregated opinion is a global indicator of the decision that the society —in
average— will do: either adapt or innovate.
7.2 Future Work
Some further work should be carried out to integrate the social welfare mech-
anism in algorithms such as WoLF or one of its variants.
Also tests in zero-sum games would clarify whether this mechanism works
well in pure competitive games. Some scenarios —rock, paper, scissors;
matching pennies; etc.— are a good benchmark in zero-sum games.
Related to this line of research is the possibility of computing the simi-
larity of goals of two agents given their social opinions. Intuitively we can
say that when two agents have similar opinions, their goals are similar, with
increasing probability as time increases. This similarity would be semanti-
cally similar to a composition between trust and reputation between both
agents, but will allow what we just sketched in section 5.1: having a degree
of similarity. In order to have agents with different goals sharing the same
environment it is crucial to carry out this computation. Some ideas are to
use graph spectral analysis, using an opinion distance function as the weight
of the arc between two agents.
A thorough study of which types of functions are suitable for the 11 di-
mensions in the personality could be interesting. Of course there are some
which would not work at all, and some which should work very well, depend-
ing on both the problem and the functions that other agents are using. It
would be interesting to see when and why incompatibilities —if there will be
any— can arise.
Further work could be developed studying the dynamics of the system
between changes. Although converge is guarantied, the dynamics of how the
agents would see their policies affected are not clarified in this work. Also
a mechanism to extend this social opinion to temporal difference learning
would be desirable.
Probably the most ambitious work would derive from the fact that agents
could start communication by using environmental mechanical objects. In
the model presented there was a distinction between mechanical and social
actions, as well as their environments associated, but could the communica-
tion be achieved in a higher level by using only mechanical actions? That
question, where very appealing, needs to be refined and cautiously examined.
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Of course, methods for faster convergence of Q–learning or other RL
algorithms —such as temporal differences— would come in handy to this
approach. Also distance functions between cases which could adapt the im-
portance of variables could lead to a better model and algorithm.
Functions for the reuse phase which could map back the learned policy
for the observed input have not been used in this work. A full study of how
to do this mapping —which in some sense is the inverse mapping observed
in the retrieval phase— would be constructive. Finding a good set of map-
ping functions for the retrieval and reuse phase, although is usually problem
dependent, would make the system a much more powerful one.
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